Heidegger und die Sprache

Heideggers thought is almost solely about language. Language is not the way we “understand” the world as a subject, but rather the opposite way: Language transcends our world, the language makes something with us and without language there is no “world”.
It is very, very remarkable, that in all European languages you have only nominal-sentences with “being”, or can you give an example, that differs from that rule?

For an English speaking guy it may all be the same, because English has almost lost all of its endings. But if you know some Latin, you would see, that the nominative and accusative have always different endings. The nominative is always the basic form, that goes with “being”.
If you say: “I’m blind”. It is a strange equation in a nominal sentence, because you still have other qualities than only being blind. If you say: “The house is white”. It is logically seen not true. The concrete house has stains ect. It is never pure or 100 % white. So “our” language family has a strong tendency towards an idealisation of “being” in a nominal-sentence. In Hebrew you can write a nominal-sentence without “being”. Why not in English, Latin or German?